Thread: BUG #17157: authorizaiton of dict_int and bloom extention
The following bug has been logged on the website: Bug reference: 17157 Logged by: Lily Zhang Email address: bjzhangl@cn.ibm.com PostgreSQL version: 13.3 Operating system: os390x Description: 1. Since dict_int is trusted, we create extension of dict_int with normal user. But when alter maxlen of intdict, it reports error. This is the detail. ``` admin=> create extension dict_int; CREATE EXTENSION admin=> ALTER TEXT SEARCH DICTIONARY intdict (MAXLEN = 7); ERROR: must be owner of text search dictionary intdict ``` 2. Since pg13 supports trusted extension, we make bloom trusted by changing control file. Everything runs well except drop extension with normal user who creates this extension. ``` test=> create extension bloom; CREATE EXTENSION test=> drop extension bloom; ERROR: must be superuser to drop access methods ```
On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 4:19 PM PG Bug reporting form <noreply@postgresql.org> wrote:
The following bug has been logged on the website:
Bug reference: 17157
Logged by: Lily Zhang
Email address: bjzhangl@cn.ibm.com
PostgreSQL version: 13.3
Operating system: os390x
Description:
1. Since dict_int is trusted, we create extension of dict_int with normal
user. But when alter maxlen of intdict, it reports error. This is the
detail.
```
admin=> create extension dict_int;
CREATE EXTENSION
admin=> ALTER TEXT SEARCH DICTIONARY intdict (MAXLEN = 7);
ERROR: must be owner of text search dictionary intdict
```
2. Since pg13 supports trusted extension, we make bloom trusted by changing
control file. Everything runs well except drop extension with normal user
who creates this extension.
```
test=> create extension bloom;
CREATE EXTENSION
test=> drop extension bloom;
ERROR: must be superuser to drop access methods
```
For (1), if we set an extension "trust", the database will execute the "create" action as a superuser, so the owner of the created object is the superuser. I think this is a "feature", not a "bug".
For (2), it was already been fixed in commit: b1d32d3e3230f00b5baba08f75b4f665c7d6dac6.
--
There is no royal road to learning.
HighGo Software Co.
Hi, IMHO, these problems are not data errors or crashes, but rules that are inconsistent with expectations. As for what is the "correct" expectation, I think we need more opinions from other hackers.
On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 11:48 AM Li EF Zhang <bjzhangl@cn.ibm.com> wrote:
Got it! Thanks!My question:1. If an ordinary user create the extension, my understanding is that the object created in the extension should be the user who create the extension?2. Will the fix for bloom be applied on pg13?
There is no royal road to learning.
HighGo Software Co.
w On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 12:48 PM Li EF Zhang <bjzhangl@cn.ibm.com> wrote: > > Got it! Thanks! > My question: > 1. If an ordinary user create the extension, my understanding is that the object created in the extension should be theuser who create the extension? The doc says: If the extension is marked trusted in its control file, then it can be installed by any user who has CREATE privilege on the current database. In this case the extension object itself will be owned by the calling user, but the contained objects will be owned by the bootstrap superuser (unless the extension's script explicitly assigns them to the calling user). So in your case, the extension dict_int itself is owned by the user who created it (i.g., executed CREATE EXTENSION) whereas the objects of the extension such as intdict are owned by the superuser. > 2. Will the fix for bloom be applied on pg13? I think that the commit b1d32d3e3 won't be backpatched to PG13 but this behavior seems like a bug to me. I would expect that "DROP EXTENSION trusted-bloom" by non-superuser owner succeeds if it’s a trusted extension. (“trusted-bloom” here means “bloom” extension you made trusted by changing the control file) Looking at the commit b1d32d3e3, the fact that that "DROP EXTENSION trusted-bloom” by non-superuser can drop the access method belonging to the extension seems like a side effect of this commit. Previously, since we did the superuser check in RemoveAccessMethodById() that drops an access method object from the catalog, even if a non-superuser reaches this function (e.g., when dropping a trusted extension), it ended up an error. By this commit, we removed this function along with the superuser check and used DropObjectById() instead for unifying similar purpose functions. Therefore, "DROP EXTENSION trusted-bloom” by non-superuser succeeds. I’m not sure whether the removal of superuser check by this commit is intentional, but IIUC it’s okay the fact that we don’t do superuser check at DropObjectById() or RemoveAccessMethodById(). We do the superuser check at a higher layer (see RemoveObjects() and check_object_ownership()). And an access method always is owned by superuser even if it belongs to a trusted extension. The only path where a non-super user attempts to drop an access method without the superuser check is when dropping the trusted extension by non-superuser owner, which is a legitimate operation. If my understanding is correct, I wonder if we can remove the superuser check from RemoveAccessMethodById() in PG13 (see the attached patch), making “DROP EXTENSION trusted-bloom” by non-superuser owner work. On the other hand if not correct, that is, if there is another path where non-superuser attempts to drop an access method by calling DropObjectById() without the prior superuser check, I think we should fix HEAD and PG14 by bringing RemoveAccessMethodById() back to the code. Regards, -- Masahiko Sawada EDB: https://www.enterprisedb.com/
Attachment
On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 12:22 AM Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2. Will the fix for bloom be applied on pg13?
I think that the commit b1d32d3e3 won't be backpatched to PG13 but
this behavior seems like a bug to me. I would expect that "DROP
EXTENSION trusted-bloom" by non-superuser owner succeeds if it’s a
trusted extension. (“trusted-bloom” here means “bloom” extension you
made trusted by changing the control file)
Looking at the commit b1d32d3e3, the fact that that "DROP EXTENSION
trusted-bloom” by non-superuser can drop the access method belonging
to the extension seems like a side effect of this commit.
Yeah, I said much the same thing on the adjacent thread on this topic.
David J.